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Disclosed: An exploration of board remuneration committee challenges

Savo Kovaevi

University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia, s.kovacevic{at}unsw.edu.au

Executive rewards in Australia have continued to climb in the face of calls and attempts to curb their growth. Despite the proliferation of codes of best corporate governance practice and the introduction of legislation in the 1990s requiring companies to disclose executive salaries, remuneration committees did not play a major role in slowing the growth of executive pay. This article reports the results of an empirical study of committee members. It explores issues in the formulation of executive pay from a committee perspective. The study found that requirements for disclosure did little to ensure modest packages were awarded. Indeed, disclosure requirements were often cited as one of the causes of pay escalation.

Key Words: disclosure • executive remuneration • executive remuneration committee • ratcheting-up effects • transparency

Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 47, No. 2, 201-218 (2009)
DOI: 10.1177/1038411109105442


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